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SHARES WITH DIFFERENTIAL VOTING RIGHTS: A
LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
Abbishek Nath Tripatbi'
Uttam Maheshwari
Introduction
"Through an evolutionary process, firms gravitate

toward efficient ownership structures."'

The evolution towards an efficient ownership structure is a process that requires an efficient and
appropriate regulatory framework. Law is the instrument that provides direction to this evolution. The
Companes (Amendment) Act, 2000 is a step in that direction, bringing in a more rational corporate
governance structure to the Indian scenario. The recognition of shares with differential rights or
"differential shares", as they are commonly called, is a part of this process of rationalisation.

This concept, antithetical to the idea of "one share, one vote", has been criticised by many for being
opposed to the principle of democratic corporate governance. While some experts argue that
concentrating all the power in the hands of a few members of the company opens the floodgates for
abuse, others are of the opinion that such shares are essential instruments that assist companies in
raising capital without affecting the existing power balances in the company.
This paper seeks to analyse differential shares from a perspective that combines law and economics.
The first section analyses the concept of voting and its implications for shares with differential voting
rights. The second section discusses the role played by differential shares in corporate governance
while the third analyses the working of differential voting shares in the United States and the United
Kingdom. This paper concludes with the present situation and possible working of such voting rights
in India.

Voting and Differential Shares
Voting as a phenomenon firms the backbone of modern democracy, where each citzen has a right to
vote and correspondingly, has equally disbursed rights and obligations.. The significance of the power
to vote within a corporate structure must be viewed in light of the vital role that modern corporations
play in the quotidian life of an economy. After the Companies (Amendment) Act, 2000 companies
have the freedom to derogate from the common law principle of "one share, one vote".
The Economics of Voting and Differential Shares

It is difficult to conceive of any commercial law without an economic basis and the justifications foir
differential shares also largely seek refuge in economic rationales. In any company, all investors are
not equally interested in actively participating in the affairs of a company; many would be content
with other incentives, like relatively high returns in the form of dividends.
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The reasons for lack of interest by most of the shareholders in the company's day-to-day functioning
and the general meetings lie in the power that they wield in the company. For example, if participation in the affairs of the company affects a shareholder to the tune of Rs.1000, then each
shareholder's optimal investment in the participation would be zero if she were sure that the affairs
of the company would be run in the same way whether or not she participated. If there were 1000
shareholders acting as a collective, the effect of their participation as a group would be worth Rs.10
Iakhs. For an individual shareholder who has made an investment worth Rs. 11000, it is not worthwhile
to participate in a decision which may affect Rs.10 lakhs. In addition, since there are 1000 shareholders, it is pertinent to note that they will each have access to inadequate information. Therefore, the incentive for a small shareholder to participate in the affairs of the company is minimal'
However, shareholders axe not fungible and those who hold greater number of shares, such as investment companies, mutual funds, pension trusts, etc., have greater incentive to participate since they
have greater capacity to influence decision-making' With this end in view, shares with differential
rights can help in monitoring the management. A small shareholder who has litle or no incentive to
spend on monitoring the company, may easily turn into a passive investor. On the other hand, large
shareholders like institutional investors, if vested with higher voting rights will use such rights in a
manner that is beneficial to the other shareholders; for instance by preventing managers from shirking
from their duties. 4
It is also argued that the interests of the management are normally more closely tied with the corporation than the well diversified shareholder's interests. Thus, the management would be looking for
compensation that has greater value than what the other shareholders would aim for. Shares that have
greater voting rights would ensure that the control remains with the management ard would avoid
shareholder opportunism that may be detrimental to the company in general.
The one share, one vote principle of democratic corporate governance has a clear economic basis and
where this principle does not apply, there is no direct correspondence between residual income rights
(residual because the equity shareholder holds only a residual right to the income in the company) and
control rights, and this may impair the exercise of control by those who run the business of the

Timothy K. O'Neil, Rik 19r-4 ThE SEC Goes Too FarsAdopang a One Share, One ltote]R,
at 1076. (Hereinafter "'O'Nei").

83 NMvU. L Rrv. 1057 (1989)

This has been derived from the explanation given by Easterbrook and Pischel Frank for the ritionle of voring For an advanced explanation, see, - Easterbrook and Daniel R. Fischel, Voting in Corporate Las, 26(2) J. L. & lCON. 395 (1983) at
402. (Nereinafter "EAsterbrook and Fischer'). Those who oppose the issuance of shares with varied voting rights use this
aigurnent to say that the courts should not give effect to such shares though they are issued after the shareholders approve
of the issue in the general meeting since such a vote, more often than nor, is an uninformed vote and consequently should
nor be given effect to as shareholders undervalue their voting rights and acquiesce to the managerial recommendations regardless of us costs to thern individually However, it is worth noting that such an interpretation would be applicable to all
decisiouns taken in the general meeing, hence making the general meeting a useicas exercis.

Set, Chrimnan K. Misus, Non-Tnng shares in Trance. An Enpiri An
sn ef thS Veog Prer,
fnrnkutulkeSchnidle/WPa/wpk 2 (viited on November 8, 2001). (Hereinafter "Muns'.
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company' A shareholder who holds ill the voting rights but only a small fraction of the shares may
pursue interests beside maximisation of the value of the company's equity, since she does not hear
the full consequences of her decisions. Thus, companies with non-voting shares may be inefficient
due to their shareholding structure, and this inefficiency may even result in a de-listing of the
company from the stock market. This is the reason why the New York Stock Exchange ('NYSE")
and London Stock Exchange do not favour isting of corporations with non-voting issues,
The approach, however, can be theoretically disputed by the application of the Coase theorem on
economic analysis of law Ronald Coase observed that in the absence of transaction costs, the
ultimate use of a resource will be determined not by the initial assignment of property rights between
two parties, but rather on the basis of which of the two parties can put the resources to its highervalued use: "The one who values the resource more highly will have the means and incentive to
induce the other party to exchange her rights to the resource."'
For our purposes, we assume that differential shares are an unrestricted method of capital structuring
in a given system. Since the vote attached to the share under such a regulatory framework is not
restricted in terms of its issuability and exchangeability, the ultimate destination of the rights attached
to the vote will be determined by the initial arrangements made between the parties when the stock is
first offered publicly, and then later on, upon exchanges between existing shareholders, in which the
right to vote shifts to those who value it most though such a shifting has not been allowed under the
rules framed by the Department of Company Affairs Those who value voting rights the most are
typieally families or controlling or promoter shareholder groups. Such groups may eventually bargain
with other shareholders in order to make an exchange in which capital is raised without them having
to dilute their controlling positions- Under normal circumstances, bargaining between shareholders is
an ongoing process dat companies can modify or reverse Specifically, companies may decide to shift
from a dual-class structure to a single-class structure at a later date, or they may simply choose to alter
the

existing dual-class

structure.

Thus, the conclusion that dual-class structures constitute a

This view is disputed severely by those who argue that proponents of this position fail to recognise the versatility inherent
in the voting mechanism. It does not necessarily follow that an unequal relationship between voting power and residual
interest creates larger agency costs or inefficiencies Specifically decreasing the risk associated with firm-specific capital
investing while increasing the incentives for firm-specific human capital investing may outweigh the values associated with
meaningful outside shareholder voting power. This is based on the analysis that voting rights in the hands of interested and
active investors would raise the human capial in the firm as they would ensure effective functioning of the company. It is
suggested by the proponents of this approach that the value of a vote should be seen separately from the underlying value
of the share and it is suggested that such an approach w6uld remove unnecessary obstacles to capital formation. The vote
and the value attached to it can be manipulated to iaximise the aggregate value of the firm's securities. For an extensive
analysis of rhs approach, see, Ashton, mpir note 1.
Ronald H Coase, The ProblS

of Sadl Cost 3J. L & EcoN. 1 (1960) at 1. (Hereinafter 'Coase").

Rule 3 (9)(c) of the Companies (issue of Share capital with Differential Voting Rights) Rules, 2001 provides that "The
company shall not convert its equity capital with voting rights into equW share capital widh differential voting rights and
the shares with differentisi voting rights into equity share capital with voting tigh&s
Ronald

Ja

Gilsoi,

Ee#akdg Dal Class Canaan

tiack The Reksance of Sabriufn,

(Hereinafter "Gilson").
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permanent alteration in a firm's ownership structure, and have permanent implications for the
corporate governance of the firm, is erroneous.
It is important to explain, at this juncture, the process of conversion of single class stocks in a
company into dual class stock, Dual classes of shares can be created through the process of recapitalisation. In this case, the new class of common shares have increased voting tights, but the
dividend rights are proportionately reduced. Thus, if there is a ten-fold increase in the voting rights,
there would be a ten-fold reduction in the dividend that each share receives. Thus, it is for the
shareholders to make a choice between shares that confer greater managerial power and those that
earn greater dividends."
The following processes are available for the creation of dual class stock and capital re structuring:
*

Exchange Mechanism: There are different kinds of shares, long-term and short-term shares.
This mechanism provides that the shares with additional voting rights would lose such
voting rights if transferred beyond the specified group of shareholders.

*

Exchange Ofre In this scenario, the existing shareholders are given a choice to either
surrender their voting rights for economic benefits in terms of increased dividends or retain
the same voting and dividend rights."

*

Super-voaing Stock: In this case, after an amendment in the constitutional documents of the
company, a new voting stock is issued which has increased voting rights and decreased
dividend rights. In addition, there is restricted transferability of the shares. Thus, in case of
an impermissible transfer, the shares would be converted to a lesser voting stock."

*

Limited Phased Vofing Here, there is a limitation on the voting rights after a shareholder has
acquired a certain number of shares. This protects the company from hostile takeovers.

*

Leveraged Buy Out. In the case of leveraged buy out, the shareholders of the company itself
acquire the shares carrying voting rights. The group of shareholders that wish to acquire the
management of the company proposes to purchase all the shares of the company and pay

Ashton, sspra note 1.
"

In the United States, in the typical exchange offer re-capitalisation, shareholders have to first approve an amendment
authotsing issuance of a new class of common stock carrying several votes ier share. In India, as per the Companies
(Issue of Share Capital with Differential Voting Rights) Rules, approval of shareholders in general meeting by passing a
resolution under Section 94(1)(a) read with Section 94(2), Companies Act, 1956, is required.
Gilson, sspra note B, Rt B14.
Additional voting rights are attached to such long-term shares, held continuously for a period of 48 months prior ro the
date of amendment All these shares are freely transferable, but any such transfer would take away the additionsl voting
rights, except when the transfer is made to the family members. Such a formulation enhances the voting rights of the
management much more than the distribution of super voting rights. Jeffrey N. Gordon, Ties that Bond Dual Class Comon
Stock and fbe Problem of Shareholder Choice, 76 CAIr. L. REv. 3 (1998) ast43.
rThe
management may announce cash payouts to shareholders if the re-capitalisation is adopted, but not otherwise. This
further aggravates the problem of shareholders in making a choice arising from the dual common stack. It is for the
shareholders to make a determination as to the benefits that may accrue to them due to the exchange and accordingly vote
on the proposal. IbiT at 49.

1

James M. Adrian, Sec Rie 19c-4: Fehering the Pmrposn of he Exchadge Act or Federal Enaachmnent on Corporate
Goonnernae?,
New ENG.L. Rav. 589 (1989) at 601. (Hereinafter "Adrian").
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other shareholders cash for the same. Till the time such group gets the majority of shares in
the company, the rights of other shareholders are frozen. Thus, the shareholders selling the
shares cannot participate any longer in the management of the company 1
Arguments in favour of differential shares derive largely from the premise that voluntary exchanges
are good for any legal system since they reduce transaction costs." Restrictions upon such
transactions impose social costs since they discourage individuals from investing capital and energy in
projects that they would have invested in the absence of such restrictions. It is argued that this was
true of the one share, one vote rule, as many companies intending to raise capital through the issue
of equity share capital did not do so because of the threat of takeovers. An enabling law like the
present one, which allows the issue of shares with differential rights, allows firms to make some
shareholders better off without making other shareholders worse off.
Further, differential shares would also facilitate the informed shareholder in making a proper choice
as to the nature of the share she wishes to purchase. Some may desire control over management,
others higher dividend, and still others may be interested in ensuring that there are no hostile takeovers.
The experience of a large number of countries show that non-voting shares or differential voting
shares trade at a discount in the securities markets. This is more so where the fight for control in a
company is severe. This results in limited trading of non-voting shares in the stock exchanges of
major economies and consequently, their contribution to the raising of equity capital is minimal."
The voting right premium attached to shares with a high number of votes arises from the fact that
holders of such shares may derive various personal benefits in addition to dividends and capital gains,
which are not available to holders of restricted voting shares." Such benefits may range from high
wages and payments in kind to the exploitation of other business relationships that such shareholders
may have with the company." In this context, it must be kept in mind that share transactions in stock
markets generally take place not because of the dividends that will be obtained but due to the
probability of capital appreciation affected by the fluctuation in share prices. Capital appreciation is
the most important determinant for an individual investor investing in a company. Since shares with
restricted voting rights would sell at a discount in the share market, it means that the possible benefit
which the investor would have derived from buying shares with restricted voting rights are reduced.
In addition, for the promoter, non-voting shares will only serve as a means of securing control over
the company rather than as an instrument for raising capital. In turn, only those companies in which
the promoter intends to exercise absolute control would resort to this practice.

See, Gilson, supmonote 8, at 812.
Conse himself propounded this theory in his famous theorem. See, Coase, supra note 6
"

To look at the French experience and an international comparison, see, Conse, s0pm note 6.

1a For an analysis of voting right premium, see, Muu, spra note 4. For an analysis of the Brazilian experience se, Richard
Sami, Differenal Padng of Equly Clae Mart Control and Corporate Goarnm, http://wwwl.oeadorg/df/corpororeaffairsLgovernance/roiundsableo/in-tin-america/2000/saLho
(visited on November 8, 2001). See also, Richard Sairo,
Determnnas of Dglinnia Pcdng of Equl Classer in the Briline Equit Market bap://wwwtvsp.br/eventos/ennnpad/
PDF/fin determinants (visited on November 8, 2001)
9

See genedly, Muus, smpr note 4-
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The Legal Basis for Differential Voting Shares
While most of the justifications for the differential shares are economic and have already been
discussed, there are a few other rationales that require elaboration in legal terms. Some of the legal
justifications offered for differential voting rights are as follows:
*

Freedom of Contract A corporation is formed by agreements between the shareholders and the
corporation, and among the shareholders interse. If the corporation is formed through contracts
then the parties should have the freedom to decide their rights and liabilities?2 It is argued that
there is no moral or political claim to equal voting rights since it is a matter of contract between
the shareholders and the company?1 Any contract entered into between the parties should be
permitted so far as it does not violate fundamental public policy. So, issuance of differential
shares on the basis of a contract that does not run contrary to public policy should be
permitted.

*

The Policwal andMoral Basis of the One Shan, One Vote Prinarle.While comparing corporations to
nation states, it has been argued that corporations derive their legitimacy from the democratic
nature of their general meetings. This comparison does not account for the fact that unlike in a
democratic polity, a share is property and all rights attached to the share are property rights. If
the shareholders are willing to give up their right, then that is a legitimate exercise of their
discretion. The one share, one vote principle is a principle more suited to pure democratic
theory rather than contractual relations?

Differential Shares and Corporate Governance
The corporation is a web of contractual arrangements and voting rights form an integral aspect of
such contracting. Voting, as an aspect of risk-beating, provides for all the decisions that can be made
under contract. Authorisation for delegation of power for the day-to-day business of the company
comes from the general meeting where all shareholders who are entitled to do so, vote and decide
upon the extent of delegation.?
Implications for corporate governance arise from the fact that in the case of differential shares,
shareholders with lower voting rights end up losing control over the general meeting, despite their
level of risk in the company remaining the same. In such an event, if shareholders with lower voting
rights were sought to be compensated by the provision of preferential right to dividend or proceeds
upon winding up, such preferential rights would be impermissible as they would make the share in

Contracts play an important role in the economy and every party has the freedom to enter into a contract but the question
that arises ias the extent to which law does or should assume that parties enjoy freedom of economic decision while
enterng into contracts. Freedom of contract gives a party the freedom to enter into a contract if she so chooses on
whatever terms she considers advanrageous Freedom to contract is ideal so long as equality exists in the bargaining
powers of the respective contracting parties and no injury is caused to the interests of community at large. A.G. GUEST
(ed.), AsNsows LAw or CONTRAcTs 4 (271 edo., 1998).
4
Peter N. Flocost, Tnardr aijakhf Ryk Aproach to Me f0ne Share Ow Von" ContoewrnAn
taphfortRSBC Ru 19 ?,
138 L. PA. L. Re.v. 1761 (1990) at 1785. (Hereinafter 'Flocot").
2 Id
'

Easterbrook and Fischer, stpra note 3, at 401.
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question a preferential share rather than an equity share.' Thus, it becomes necessary to examine
alternative methods of compensating shareholders with lower voting rights2
The powers vested in the board of directors are distinct from the powers of the general meeting. The
general meeting cannot encroach upon the powers of the board of directors unless it is specifically
empowered to do so by the Memorandum of Association or the Articles of Association. If the
general meeting is not satisfied with the working of the board of directors, the only remedy available
to the general meeting is to either remove the directors or not re-elect them.2i In a regime of
disproportionate voting rights, the directors would be able to re-elect themselves if they had the
support of the controlling shareholders, especially when such controlling shareholders are far fewer in
number because of the prevalence of differential shares. Thus, the only check on the power of the
director would be rendered ineffective. Conversely, a director working in the interests of the company
but who is out of favour with the controlling shareholders might be removed.
It is argued that such shares with disproportionate voting rights curtail the independence of the
executive directors and managers appointed by the company as a collectivity of shareholders, as the
other directors with greater voting rights would be able to exert greater influence on the decision
taken in the general meeting. This would make their position increasingly dependent on the other
directors. On the other hand, excessive protection to the management would make it immune to the
threat of takeovers and would affect the internal discipline that it otherwise possesses.'
In fact, in 1952, the Report of the Company Law Committee pointed out that such disproportionate
voting rights (which were allowed under the [1ndian] Companies Act, 1913) had facilitated investment
by promoters in risky businesses, an initiative which would have otherwise not been possible. The
Committee also pointed out that this system of voting facilitated control of the undertaking by the
minority shareholder. Thus, it amounted to a legal device whereby the minority could assume control,
often with adverse consequences.
Section 88 was inserted in the Companies Act to prohibit the issue of equity shares with differential
voting or other rights as to dividend, capital or otherwise," on the recommendation of the Company
Law Committee in 1952. This provision, however, was made applicable only to public companies

Section 85, Companies Act classifies share capital into two classes: preference share capital and equity share capital.
Differential shares have been allowed as a part of equity shareholding only. Hence, if in order to lower the risk bearing of
the holders of shares with lower voting rights, any preferential right to dividend or in repayment of capital upon winding
up is given, it would convert it into a preference share, which is nor permissible under Section 86, Companies Act.
One way to compensate the shares with lower voting rights is to link it to the dividends, i.e. a person with normal voting
rights will get a norral rate of dividend and a person with lower number of votes will enjoy a higher rate of dividend.
However, the rate cif return depends an how companies structure these shares. In a company with differential shares,
usually different types of stocks like A-class and B-class stocks are issued Generally, A-class shares are called superior
voting shares and B-class shares are called inferior voting shares.
RoDERT R. PENNINGTON, COMPANY

LAw 706 (1995).

7 George W Dent, Jr., Dia/Class Capitali'dion.-A 1&p# to ProfousnrSeoan,54 Geno. WAsi

. Rev. 725 (1986) at 739.

It should be observed that such differential voting rights were not automatically cancelled with the coming into force of
Companies Act in 1956. Vishanati Dass andathr v. FaqirChand,AR.I. 1968 Del. 6.
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while private companies were free to issue differential shares.
Thus, a few shareholders having greater voting rights are able to influence and determine the
decisions of the company, irrespective of whether the decisions are taken in the general meeting or a
meeting of the board of directors. However, such vesting of power in a few could be justified in
terms of the risks assumed by such persons as well as the expertise that they command over the
management, specifically, and business, in general.

Differential Shares as a Defence to Takeovers
It has been asserted that only those with large financial stakes in the company should have enhanced
voting rights. Thereby, all actions that would be taken by them would be in the interest of the
company, as their interests would necessarily relate to the company's interests. Further, these persons
would normally be involved in the day-to-day administration of the company's affairs.' The main
impact of shares with differential voting rights is that such shares place control in the hands of those
who have superior voting rights. This protects the non-controlling shareholders from coercive
takeovers and also ensures that they do not transfer control of the company to outsiders without
adequate information as to the benefits that such a move would secure. At the same time, the
management is also protected from changes effected without their consent;
Differential shares as a takeover defence may help protect the dominant position of the promoter or
a collectivity of shareholders. Such collectives could form a coalition within the company and limit
the influence of others. Differential shares are most likely to be found in companies with
concentrated ownership and in family-controlled companies rather than in widely held companies.1
The management can use differential shares to strengthen its position in the company. For example,
in a company with Rs.100 crore as issued share capital, 2 the promoter holds Rs.10 crore worth of
shares. In order to increase her voting power, the promoter subscribes to shares having additional
voting rights (for example, four votes per share)? By subscribing to such differential shares wnrth
Rs.33 crores, the promoter would, in effect, be able to raise her voting power to 61%, while her share
in the total capital would be merely 32%?
The threat of a takeover keeps the management alert and often forces it to work efficiently

a

Flocost, sopra note 21, at 1799.

a

Gilson,.rupra note 8, at 812.

This phenomenon is empirically proven in jurisdictions that allow for shares with differential voting rights. See,Mus,
note 4.

sapra

* Where each share is for Re.1, carrying one vote for every share.
"

The calculation is as follows: If shares worth "N" crores are issued, then the new capital would be Rs.(100+x) crores.
According to the rules governing the issue of differential shares, it cannot be more then 25% of the share capital. Thus,
"x" would be 25% of Rs (100+x) crores; and then "a" would be Rs.33.3 crores. See,Anrish Shah and Jinesh Shah, Makiby
the RIgbtover; Teu EcoNoMic TIsms, November 17, 2001, at 5.

* Before the issue of new shares the soral number of votes were 100 crores. After a new issue worth Rs,33.3 crores of
shares, and 4 votes per share, there would be an addition of 133.2 shares, totalling 233.2 votes. Prior to the issue, the
promoter had 10 crore shares, but after the issue she would have 143.2 crore shares. Thus, the promoter would now have
61% votes with 32% equity investment.
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Differential shares dilute this threat because the shareholders do not have enough power to maintain
the reality of the threat. Thus, the activities of the management goes unchecked to a certain extent, as
it is effectively not answerable to the general meeting that possesses insufficient voting rights to
change the management.
On the other hand, given the fact that the small shareholder's interest is motivated by the monetary
return that she derives from the share, it is probable that she could be lured away by hawks in the
market looking for an opportunity to make a takeover bid. This becomes a critical issue, especially in
the Indian context, where the promoters have traditionally had small shareholdings. This constituted
one of the primary reasons that motivated the Indian promoters in the industry to lobby for the
introduction of differential shares." Low promoter shareholding increases the risks relating to
shareholder opportunism.

The One Share, One Vote Principle: Experiences in Other Jurisdictions
The English Experience
The one share, one vote principle has had an interesting evolution in common law Initially, courts
drew an analogy from partnerships where every partner had one vote in the management, to
recognise equal voting rights of all shareholders irrespective of the equity invested by the person.
Later, this gave way to the idea of one share, one vote which made the distinction on the basis of
amount of equity one held in the company. This approach allowed shareholders to have control over
the management depending upon the investment made by the person in the company. The rule also
facilitated large investments by many investors who were looking for security when they invested in
equiry as it was expected that every shareholder would vote guided by his own interests and that
would ultimately benefit the company."
The courts have also upheld provisions in the Articles of a company which provided additional votes
to the directors in case of a resolution seeking to remove a director. Such additional rights were
recognised under English law. The rationale was that that though the [Enghsb Companies Act
provided for removal of directors by simple majority, it did not bar the issue of shares with additional
voting rights to the directors at the time resolutions were moved against them.' Even where there
was a requirement of further issue of shares for the purposes of a takeover, and this led to a
reduction in the voting power enjoyed by the management, the court upheld the resolution that
doubled the votes with the management?"
Mr. Abid Hussain. when heading the Planning Commission iin 1989 had recommended that well-managed cornpanes
should be gien the freedom to have differential voting rights, and in such a case, higher dividend rights should be given to
shares with ksser voting rights. SVenugopalan, Newedy Slares, [2001] 30 SCL. 159 (Mag.).
O'Neil, spra nore 2, at 1063.
In Brrddeliv. thub, 119701, 1 All ER. 53, it was held that in such cases it should be considejed as an incorporated partnershi,
with each partner having a right to protect himself from being removed by ocher partners.
In this case there were two kinds of shares with the company: management shares carrying eight votes each and ordinary
shares carrying one vote each. For the purpose of rake-over of another company, the un-issued ordinary shares of the
company were issued. However, as such issue of shares would have reduced the present voting percentage of the
management, it was decided that the votes attached to each management share would be doubled to sixteen votes per
share. Such doubling of voting rights was challenged. Raght and Inuer Lnreshnenf Lydavi Turr Liamd v Soo Shes Umited
andothen 11964 3 All E R 629.
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The Jenkins Committee formed in 1962 recommended that non-voting shares or restricted voting
shares should not be abolished due to the following reasons."
1.
2.
3.
4.

Taking over is merely a matter of contract;
Some investors prefer to buy non-voting or restricted voting shares as they are available at a
cheaper rate, and have a higher rate of return;
Non-voting and restricted voting shares have facilitated the promotion of companies by
families, thus boosting the economy;
Non-voting shares facilitate the retention of control of important companies within the UK.

The American Experience
Until the 1920s, the one share, one vote principle enjoyed primacy in the American corporate world.
This changed with the introduction of the practice of issuing non-voting stock in public companies.
By 1926, there were regulations framed by the NYSE which imposed a prohibition on shares with
disparate (used interchangeably with "differential') voting rights. This practice of one share, one vote
was made a rule immediately after the Civil War, as there were many companies that had started using
differential voting rights through which the management retained power with very little equity
participation."' For example, one could examine Dillon Read Company's acquisition of Dodge
Brothers, Inc. In this acquisition, Dillon Read paid $2.25 million for an enterprise valued at $130
million.40 This restriction against differential shares continued until July 1986 when it was removed by
the NYSE. 4 2 The reconsideration of the one share, one vote principle started due to the fact that
institutional investors in the company, unlike the dispersed shareholders, had greater access to
information and communication. Due to political pressure, the NYSE once again framed Rule 19c4 that sought to mandate a general one share, one vote rule for America's publicly traded companies
and to ban, with few exceptions, dual class re-capitalisation transactions.
The following are the regulations that have been framed by the subcommittee of the NYSE which if
not complied with, may entail delisting-'
L
2.

The transaction by means of which the shares with different voting rights are to be issued
must be approved by two-thirds of all shareholders entitled to vote on the proposition.
If the issuer has a majority of independent directors at the time the matter is voted upon, a
majority of such directors must approve the proposal. If the issuer has less than a majority
of such directors, then all independent directors must approve.

WitNiriRn

AND BLANK, TAwrnvnsS AND MERGERs 70 (511 edn., 2001).

Adrian, repra nore 14, at 594.
Adrian, .tpra nore 14, a 594.
Adrian, rtranore 14,

at 595.

Rule 19c-4 aes: "No rule, stated policy, practice, or interpretation of an exchange shall permit the listing or the
continuance of listing, of any common stock or other equity security of a domesac issuer, if the issuer of such security
issues am' class of security, or takes other corporate action, with the effect of allifying, restricting or dispamitely
reducing the per share voting rights of holders of an ourstanding class or classes of cammon stock of such issuer
registered pursuant to Section 12 of the [Securities Exchange] Act [of 1934]"
Joel Seligman, Equal ProdcheA in Shareholder Vkd Pagts.-The One Common Shat, One Van Controwny, 54 Go.
Rmv. 687 (1986) at 687. (Hercinafter "Seligman").
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The ratio of voting differential per share is no more than one to ten.
Except for the voting power per share, the rights of the holders of the two classes of
common stock are substantially the same.

It would be interesting to examine the extent to which companies are utilising the freedom provided
by the NYSE. Only 170 of the 4886 corporations listed on NASDAQ have a dual common class of
voting shares.eThis limited use of differential shares can be attributed to the following reasons:"
i.

Com'/alkner in certain cases the management and the officers of the company alone own a
majority or near majority of the voting shares, which makes any threat of a hostile takeover
virtually impossible. In some other cases, where the managers do not own the majority of
the voting stock, effective majorities are achieved by a voting trust or shareholder vore
pooling arrangement. Therefore, apart from the need to tackle a takeover threat, there is
very little need for dual class stocks, as the management retains control on routine matters.

2

1 duation Issues: All other rights being equal, shares that carry voting rights and the power to
appoint directors and management, have a higher market value because of the premium that
any buyer would be ready to pay to get control of the company. This reduces the demand
for the lower voting stocks.

3.

-Fidudary Icruer Another argument is that the management has a fiduciary duty towards the
company, and a system of equal voting rights ensures the accountability of the management
towards the shareholder.4"

Thus, while the English experience gives the urisprudential basis for issuing differential shares, the
American experience provides practical insights into the use and regulation of differential shares. For
example, the methods adopted ftr the purpose of creating the differential voting shares, i.e., the
exchange mechanism, exchange offers, super-voting stocks, and leveraged buy outs, may be adopted
by corporate houses and rules similar to the American rules regarding the issue of differential shares
could also be used. In this context, the following rules are particularly important as they have not
been included as part of the regulatory framework for differential shares in Indiai
i.

2.

Sidar

The ratio of voting differential per share should be no more than one to ten.
Except for the voting power per share, the rights of the holders of the two classes of
common stock should be substantially the same.

6'91.

Ser geralbg Seligman, spranote 44.
The reason why, corporate boards of directons may hesitate to adopt a dual class capitalisation is that in some instances it
increases the likelihood of shareholders successfully challenging transactions underraken by managets who a-n the class
of stock with higher/exclusive voting rights. This greater legal exposure is illustrated by the case of an outsider who pays a
premium to buy the nanagememb's controlling class of stock without simultaneously making an offer for the class of stock
having higher dividend rights. Alternatively, the outsider might offer a higher price for the managements class of stock
than for the class of stock haviog higher dividend rights. Se rmrs Seligman, apm note 44.

Shares uith Dfferential Voeing RighIs

Shares with Differential Rights in India
In 2000, the Companies Act was amended and apart from other aspects, the amendment sought to
affect voting rights attached to shares. The amendment extends the facility of differential shares that
was previously only available to private companies, to public companies as well.' The only
requirement is compliance with the rules that are framed by the government in this regard.4
Shares with differential voting rights could assume various forms. The shares could carry preferential
votes, so that though the shareholder may normally have voting rights on par with the voting tights
exercisable by ordinary equity shareholders, on certain resolutions, e.g, special resolutions or on the
resolution for the election of a director, the shareholder is granted higher voting rights."
Another class of shares with differential voting rights could be those that carry a contingent right to
vote. Though under normal circumstances the voting rights attached to these shares are on par with
the voting rights enjoyed by ordinary equity shareholders, on the happening of certain events, for
example, the non-declaration of dividend, their voting rights may be doubled. Further, it may also be
provided that in the event of a failure to pay dividend, the voting rights attached to such shares will
be increased in a specific proportion.
There may also be shares that carry cumulative voting rights under certain circumstances For
example, in a vote for the election of a director, the shareholder may have on each resolution, as
many votes per share as there are directors to be elected. As a result, a director may be elected by less
than a majority of the shareholders.'The variety of forms that such shares could assume are limited
only by the number of situations where they could play a role.
The Companies AcO nowhere contemplates the possible existence of equity shares without voting
rights. The amended Section 86 of the Act envisages equity shares with differential rights as to
dividend, voting or otherwise. Further, Section 87(l)(a) provides that every member of the company
holding share capital shal have the right to vote, which clearly excludes the possibility of shares with
no voting rights. This leads to the conclusion that non-voting shares do not fall within the ambit of
the Act.

a

Section 90, Companies Act made Section 88 applicable to public companies alone. This provision restricred issuance oi
shares with differential voting rights.
Abh it Josh., Get Crvado, Tr. EoONoiic fTIMEs,May 4, 2002, at 5. See also, the Companies (Issue of Share Capital with

Differential Vaung Rights) Rules.
" hdlv. Fai,

[1970] i All E.R 53 (HL.) is a elassic example of this kind of shares where dhe direcmor ia a ressplution filr
her removal had 3 votes per share cast in her favour. The House of Lords upheld such a provision.
V R. Shah, feew of Fqei4 t'ra aidt DffernialtVdng Igbts An A4&/5bnd, 120011 32 S.C.L 127 (Mag.).
' Section 86 as it stands after the arnendment provides for two kinds of share capital:

a) EIquiiy dh capital wirh
voting rights, or
differenial rights as to dividend, voting or orherwise.
b) Preference share capital-

85

Student Bar Renz

Vol. 15

2
2003

Shares with Differential Dividend Rights
Shares with differential dividend rights are a part of the larger spectrum that includes shares with
differential voting rights. Most often, differential dividend rights are a way of compensating the
shareholder for the lower voting rights attached to a particular class of shares.
Further, differential dividend shares could exist where the shareholder has preferential rights of
dividend over a certain percentage of the face value of the share or the paid up value of the share or
a certain amount per share. Another instance could be where dividend is either cumulative or noncumulative. A cumulative dividend means that the deficiency in dividends over a certain number years
can be made up from the profits of subsequent years. Shares with rights to deferred dividend can
provide a creative solution. This would mean that after payment of a certain percentage of the
dividend to equity shareholders with voting rights, the holders of shares with deferred dividend rights
have a right to a fixed percentage of the dividend or a fixed amount of the dividend or a fixed
percentage of the profits of the company.
The Relevance of the Expression "Otherwise"
The principle of ejudem genetis would imply that the expression "otherwise"' in Section 86(a)(ii) of
the Companies Act is to be interpreted in light of the previous two expressions, that is, "differential
rights as to voting, dividends" The expression "or otherwise" would mean that the differential rights
could be with regard to dividend, voting rights or another simikr aspect. One interpretation could
argue that this includes a category of shares that was in existence before the Companies Act came
into force. However, the interpretation cannot be confined to pre-1956 type of shares alone. A few
examples of shares falling under this category could be shares with differential rights with respect to
capital, participation in surplus in case of winding up, mode of payment, etc. Apart from this class
there could be certain other classes of shares such as founder shares carrying special pre-erptory
rights when a shareholder intends to sell off her share.
Another example is that of "golden shares". Though such shares have originated through privatization
processes and been popularised by government corporations, their usage by public companies appears
to be a distinct possibility in the future. This class of share ensures that the shareholder is entitled to a
certain amount of control over the affairs of the company even when she is no longer a shareholder."
Golden shares have proved to be very effective in the disinvestment process. The concept of such a
differential share can be used to accelerate the disinvestment process as the government can dilute its
control in public sector units while maintaining a golden share to be used in exceptional circumstances.
Further, through such golden shares, the government can ensure the efficient running of the divested
company by holding a right to veto the appointment of directors or initiate proceedings for the removal
of directors.

"

Section 86 (a)(i) reads as follows: " with differential rights as to dividend, voting or otherwise, in accordance with such
rules and subjecr to such conditions as may be prescribed." (Emphasis added)
Insurance,

wCompaifs
Act ordinaner an anvil, Ti EcoNomic TwEs, October 25, 2000, httpdletinvesanoicanrenr/insumace/
(visited on April 1, 2003).

news/inacrT25awmhten
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The Companies (Issue of Share Capital With Differential Voting Rights) Rules, 2001
The rules framed by the Department of Company Affairs for the issuance of shares with differential
voting rights prescribe certain conditions that every company has to comply with. Some of the
conditions are as follows:"
*

The company's Articles of Association must authorise the issuance of differential voting
shares. However, no such requirement is mandated for shares with differential rights as to
dividends or otherwise.

*

The company must have distributable profits for the three preceding years, as per Section
205, Companies Act, before it can issue shares with differential voting rights. Since newly
incorporated companies cannot fulfil this condition, they are not allowed to issue such
differential shares.' This leads to the conclusion that no company can be incorporated with
such differential shares.

*

Rule 3(2) states that the company should not have defaulted in filing annual accounts and
annual returns for three financial years preceding the financial year in which it was decided
to issue such differential shares.,

*

The company should not have failed to meet investors' grievances. The extent of such
failure and the nature of the failure are yet to be defined. Even the failure to send a notice
for the general meeting which might be the result of administrative confusion, may invite
the unwarranted application of this rule.

*

The company must have been authorised by a special resolution under Section 94 (1)() ot
the Companies Act to issue shares with differential rights.

The Lacunae in the 2000 Amendment Act and the Rules Governing Differential Voting Rights
Though the amendment facilitates the issue of differential shares, there are many lacunae that require
to be addressed before the law can be said to be truly beneficial for the management of the company.
Under Section 86, Companies Act, companies are authorised to issue shares with differential voting
or dividend rights. This may be construed to mean that companies may either issue shares with
differential voting rights or differential dividend rights. Further, there is no provision in either the
Companies Act or the rules governing differential voting rights that specifies that shareholders must
be compensated for having given up their voting rights. The Companies Act also does not place limits
on the number of voting rights that may be attached to a share. Currently, voting rights attached to

Aniitav Ganguly, Anadsir of New Propiios of Eqnty Shares With DifferendalJihks, http:/Av onvindisinf(line.en/lecgr/I

aggrjngu

feant

(visited on May 3, 2002).

R. Thangamani, "Shares with Differential Voting Lights", [2001] 31 S.CL. 129 (Mag.). For opposite view seernerally, G. )
Agrawal, Equity .harrr ith Diradal Rbghts: In Law Also Hito Repeats tUrelt31(7) CHA RTanEO SECRETARY 761 (2001).
The earlier rule necessarily required companies to have distributable profits for the three financial years preceding the year
in which shares with differential voting rights were proposed to be issued. Now the three-year stipulation has been made
more flexible in rhat the earlier requirement of "three preceding years" as far as distributable profits are concerned his
now been altered to any three years prior to the issue of such shares. The same amendment has been made with regard r4
default in the ease of filing of acconts. Rieha Mishra and KR Srivas, DCA Relanet Nrnmsfor Differentin
Rightp,
http://vww.bLionner.n-m2002/01 /22/stories/2002Q 2201980100,htm (visited on May 3,2002)
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differential shares may go to any extent, (for instance, as high as 1000 votes per share or as low as 1/
1000 of a vote per share) provided differential shares are at least 25% of ie total issued share
capital.
As far as the requieent of no default in the payment of dividend is concerned, it applies only
where dividend is declared but not paid. Since companies may render this prvisio ineffective by
simply refraining from declaring dividends, there must exist rules requiring the regular declaration of
dividends. *

An amendment to Secdon 87 (1)(a) of the Companies Act which requires all equity shares to have
equal voting rights is urgently required in light of the fact that Section 86 of the same Act provides
that a company may issue two kinds of share capital.
The rules governing issue of shares with differential rights also stipulate that a company shall not
convert its equiry capital with equal voting rights into-equity capital with differential voting rights and
vie ars.O In this context, Section 106 of the Act, which deals with the variations of shareholders'
rights assumes irnportance." The requirement of this provision for the variation of class rights is the
consent of three-fourths of the holders of shares of that class. However, such variations can be
carried out only if the Memorandum of Association permits it or if there is no provision in the
Memorandum, if such a variation is not inconsistent with the terms of issuance of shares of that
class. Thus, there is an apparent conflict within the provision itself.
Two interpretations folow on the reading of Section 106 with Section 86 of the Actz The first
interpretation is that since Section 106 starts with the expression "where the share capital of the
company is divided into different classes of shares", it refers to Section 86 which allows for the issuance
of shares of different classes. Section 86 subjects the issue of shares of different classes to the rules
prescribed by the Government. So a combined reading of Section 106 and Section 86 leads us to the
conclusion that as the issuance of shares with differential rights is subject to the rules prescribed by the
Government, such Government rules would prevail and variation would not be allowed.
However, another interpretation is that the rules prescribed by the government under the Act are
always subject to the provisions of the Act and they cannot take away any right that has been
specifically conferred by the statute. Clause (b) of Section 106 specifically uses the expression "in the
absence of any such provision in the memorandum", which indicates that the Act expressly confers
the power on the company to decide on the permissibility of such variations at the time of its
incorporation. If the company decides to permit such variations, the law will permit it.
S. NlurlidhirAn, Seeds of Chao, hrrp://www.blonner.com/bussnesshine/2001/018/02/stories/0402122.htm

(visited on May

3,2002).
See Rule 3 (9)(c) of Companies (issue of Share Capital with Differenrtial Voting Rights) Rules.
Secoon 106 reads: "Alteration of rights of the holders of special class of shares- Where the share capital of a company is
divide into different dasses of shares, the rights arached to the shares of any class may be varied with the consent in
wnring of the holders of not tess than three-fourths of the tisued shares of that class or with the sanction of a special
resolution passed at a separate meeting of the holders of the issued shares of that classwith respect to such variation is contained in the memorandum or articles of the company, or
a) If the prin
b) in the absence of any such provision in the memorandum or articles, if such variation is nor prohibited by the terms of
the issue of shares oif that clss."
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The latter interpretation appears to be more sound. Thus, the rules should either be amended to allow
for the conversion of differential voting share into normal voting shares and vice wrsa or Section 86
should be amended and an additional clause added stating that "notwithstanding anything contained
in this Act, the rules prescribed for the issuance of shares with differential rights as to dividend, voting and otherwise shall prevail over anything contained in the Memorandum of Associanion of the
company

Conclusion: The Way Ahead
Differential shares, as a concept, is not new either in India or across the world. Such shares have
existed in almost all major economies, but the response that they have received can at best be termed
ambivalent. Even after its re-introduction in India, there has hardly been any activity in the corporate
world towards the adoption of a dual class capital structure. The reasons for such a lukewarm
response are manifold. As we have seen earlier, shares with lower voting rights trade at a discount in
the stock market rik-deis shares with higher voting rights. Thus, the opportunities for increased
income from capital appreciation in such shares are also minimal. As a result, response from
individual shareholders is normally not very enthusiastic, while large or institutional investors are
invariably interested in control. Higher dividends are rarely sufficient compensation for the loss of
control in such a situation.
Restricting the equity shares to one class alone is liable to criticism on the ground of excessive
regulation. The freedom to adopt a convenient capital structure provides companies with the option
to devise the optimal capitalisation strategies. Where such strategies do not make proper business
sense, as has been the case in many countries, market forces step in and ensure that the company does
not proceed along that path. The end result is that the structure that is best suited and most desirable
for the particular needs of the corporation is achieved, thereby maximising the efficiency of the
individual corporation as well as that of the economy within which it operates.
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